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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult challenges to the preservation of online
privacy is the protection of information once it is exposed to other
people. Generally, individuals lose control of their personal
information once they disclose it on the Internet. People do not
“own” personal information in the traditional sense.
Consequently, they are forced to rely upon the recipients of their
information, such as websites, to keep it safe.
The law provides few meaningful opportunities for Internet
users to protect their own personal information. The current
privacy laws are too limited, subjective, or vague to effectively
police the “downstream” use of information by third parties.1 Yet,
there is a growing consensus that information privacy must be
protected,2 including calls for a privacy “bill of rights.”3 The
challenge is not just if—but how—to protect an individual’s
privacy on the Internet.

1 See generally Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 357 (2011) (highlighting the conflict between disclosure privacy and the First
Amendment and proposing an alternative remedial scheme to minimize the conflict); Neil
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1887 (2010) (arguing that Professor William Prosser’s approach unduly limits privacy,
rendering it ill-equipped to adapt to the changing technological and social environment);
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (proposing a new
pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy to replace current theories that are “either
too narrow or too broad”).
2 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 66 (2009)
(advocating the creation of a “viable cyber civil rights agenda” to combat the greater ease
with which individuals can participate in socially destructive behavior and acts).
3 See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing a regulatory framework designed to protect individuals’ personal data); Brian
Achohido, White House Issues Historic Call for Privacy Bill of Rights, USA TODAY, Mar. 16,
2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/technologylive/post/2011/03/white-house-issue
s-historic-call-for-privacy-bill-of-rights/1 (noting the Obama Administration’s support for a
privacy bill of rights to protect individuals while using the Internet); Katy Bachman,
Government Dept. Recommends ‘Privacy Bill of Rights,’ ADWEEK (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.a
dweek.com/news/technology/government-dept-recommends-privacy-bill-rights-104045
(reporting the Commerce Department’s Internet Policy Task Force’s recommendations for a
privacy bill of rights); see also Public Opinion on Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://ep
ic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (citing numerous studies that demonstrate
public opinion in favor of privacy rights, including “a February 2002 Harris Poll [that] showed
that 63% of respondents thought current law [to be] inadequate to protect privacy”).
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This Essay proposes a “chain-link confidentiality” approach to
protecting online privacy. A chain-link confidentiality regime
would contractually link the disclosure of personal information to
obligations to protect that information as it is disclosed
downstream. Unlike other online privacy regimes that focus on
the private nature of information, this proposal focuses on specific
obligations within the relationships, not only between the discloser
of information and the initial recipient, but also between the
initial recipient and subsequent recipients.
Many have dismissed confidentiality law as a viable remedy for
online privacy harms because they view it as a “one-off ” protection
or as too restrictive in contexts where sharing information is
encouraged or required.4 Even advocates of confidentiality law
recognize that it is limited in that it typically only binds the initial
recipient of information.5 The discloser of information usually has
no remedy under confidentiality law against third parties that
further disclose confidential information.6 At first glance, online
information seems particularly ill-suited to be protected by
confidentiality law because of the overwhelming amount of people
who use the Internet and the ease with which information is
distributed. After all, there are an estimated 1.97 billion Internet
users worldwide visiting over 255 million websites.7 Yet, only
directly connected parties can become confidants.
Confidentiality law need not be limited to the initial recipient of
information, however. This Essay argues that the basic principles
4 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451,
512 (1995) (“The rule of confidentiality does not work nearly as well in a modern
information society.”).
5 See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1836–
50 (2010) (advocating judicial recognition of tortuous enablement, strict liability, and breach
of confidence torts against website and database operators); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 158
(2007) (noting that the American breach of confidentiality tort is less developed than the
English one in that it “applies only to a limited set of relationships” and “third-party
liability . . . has only been recognized in a few cases”).
6 See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 715–16 (2010) (highlighting that
confidentiality agreements do not extend to third parties not in privity with the original
parties).
7 Internet 2010 in Numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/
12/internet-2010-in-numbers/.
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of confidentiality and contract law can create an attractive and
broadly applicable remedy for protecting the personal information
of Internet users. This remedy would allow the obligations of
confidentiality to follow personal information downstream.
Confidentiality doctrine could become more lenient by allowing for
the limited disclosure of confidential information while also
becoming more protective by having confidentiality obligations
follow the information to third-party recipients. Courts and
lawmakers could construct systems for confidentiality protections
that follow the disclosed information in a chain-link fashion by
requiring third-party recipients of confidential information to
observe the same confidentiality obligations to which the initial
recipient agreed.
Under a regime of chain-link confidentiality, Internet users
could then pursue a remedy against anyone in the chain who
either failed to abide by her obligation of confidentiality or failed to
require confidentiality of a third-party recipient.
Even if
legislators decided not to create a private cause of action for
Internet users, a statutory privacy bill of rights could breathe life
into confidentiality doctrine by requiring obligations of
confidentiality to follow the disclosure of personal information
online.
This Essay explores various methods that courts and
lawmakers can use to create a system of chain-link confidentiality
in online data-sharing contexts. Part II of this Essay briefly
explores the challenges and desirability of maintaining privacy in
the digital age. This Part focuses on the failure of traditional
remedies to protect online privacy, which necessitates a new
approach that is clear, workable, and in harmony with other laws
and policy goals, including the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech. This part also responds to the critique that
confidentiality law is of limited applicability. It explores the
abundant opportunities for relationships and privity online and
the concentration of disclosure of personal information to a
surprisingly limited number of websites.
Part III introduces the general theory of chain-link
confidentiality. A chain-link confidentiality approach would use
contracts to link recipients of personal information.
These
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contracts would contain at least three kinds of terms: (1)
obligations and restrictions on the use of the disclosed information;
(2) requirements to bind future recipients to the same obligations
and restrictions; and (3) requirements to perpetuate the
contractual chain. The chief benefit of a chain-link confidentiality
regime is that it would protect the downstream use of information
in a clear and meaningful way. This Part explores the potential
statutory
and
contractual
applications
of
chain-link
confidentiality.
This Essay concludes by highlighting how a chain-link
confidentiality approach to protecting online privacy can be a
flexible and effective compromise that protects the downstream
use of information while accommodating the free flow of
information.
II. PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The debate as to how to protect privacy can be frustrating
because there is no fixed conceptualization of privacy.8 Professor
Daniel Solove called privacy “a concept in disarray” that
encompasses, among other things, the “freedom of thought, control
over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal
information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”9

8 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY] (noting that, despite the integral nature of privacy, nobody can
articulate exactly what privacy means); see also JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND
ISOLATION 3 (1992) (proposing to define and clarify privacy so as to construct an “escape
route” from the confusion that underlies differing notions of privacy); ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (observing that few fundamental rights remain as
undefined as privacy); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 421–
22 (1980) (discussing the confusion that exists between popular and legal concepts of
privacy rights and the scholarly concept); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 34, 35 (1967) (stating that “the concept of privacy is infected with pernicious
ambiguities”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001)
(“Privacy is a valve so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be
usefully addressed at all.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
477–78 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy] (proposing a new taxonomy of privacy to
remedy the vagueness of the concept).
9 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1.
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The law’s struggle to conceptualize privacy has often stunted its
ability to adapt to rapid technological change.10 That has been
especially true with the Internet’s rapid rise as courts grapple to
define the contours of privacy in cyberspace.11
Given the abundance of personal information available on the
Internet, privacy in the information age is a necessity.12 Without
it, Internet users are faced with the unappealing reality of
complete transparency. The question of whether privacy is or
should be protected by laws and policy seems more significant
than ever. Congress introduced at least three privacy-related
statutes at the federal level in 2011.13 Congress has also held
multiple hearings on the state of privacy.14 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has made privacy one of its most important
concerns.15 The media have devoted substantial attention to the
importance and erosion of privacy in the digital age.16 A number
10 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 1, at 357 (arguing that the concept of tort privacy is
ineffective in a digital age); Richards & Solove, supra note 1, at 1887 (explaining that
Prosser’s concept of privacy limits its adaptability in the Information Age); Solove, supra
note 1, at 1089–90 (pointing out the need for an effective law of privacy in a world of
constant technological change).
11 See, e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy for content posted
on Myspace social network); cf. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-574 (FSH) 2008 WL
6085437, at *6–7 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008) (evaluating the expectation of privacy in an
invitation-only Internet discussion space).
12 See infra notes 19, 95–98 and accompanying text.
13 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011); DoNot-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011).
14 See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2011); Nicole Friess, Senate Committee Holds Hearing on the State of Online
Consumer Privacy, INFO. L. GRP. (Mar. 16, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://www.infolawgroup.com/20
11/03/articles/data-privacy-law-or-regulation/senate-committee-holds-hearing-on-the-state-o
f-online-consumer-privacy/ (discussing Senate Committee hearing on online consumer
privacy); Brett Neely, Sen. Franken Holds Washington Hearing on Smart Phone Privacy
Issues, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO (May 10, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/
web/2011/05/10/franken-hearing/ (discussing Judiciary Subcommittee hearing on smart
phone privacy issues).
15 See Kate Kaye, Online Privacy: What to Expect in 2011, CLICKZ (Jan. 3, 2011), http://
www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1934456/online-privacy-expect-2011 (discussing the FTC’s efforts
regarding online privacy).
16 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, How Privacy Can Vanish Online, a Bit at a Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2010, at A1 (discussing problems with the availability of personal information on
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of high-profile issues, including body scanners at airports and
commercial data breaches, have directly affected a significant
portion of the American public.17
The greatest threat to an individual’s privacy might be the
collection, use, and dissemination of personal information on the
Internet. These practices, which have been well-addressed by
scholars,18 leave Internet users vulnerable to a panoply of harms
the Internet); Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, Magazine, at
MM30 (discussing the problems of living in a world where the Internet records everything
and forgets nothing).
17 See, e.g., Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011, 7:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sony-stold
endata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426 (reporting breach in Sony’s online game network that
resulted in identity theft affecting millions of users); Jeremy Kirk, Washington Post Reports
Data Breach on Job Ads Section, PCWORLD (July 7, 2011, 6:20 AM), http://www.pcworld.co
m/businesscenter/article/235189/washington_post_reports_data_breach_on_job_ads_section.
html (reporting the Washington Post’s alert regarding a data breach of its “Jobs” section);
Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.
org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (arguing that body scanners
are too invasive and discussing the effects of x-ray screening at transportation hubs).
18 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 2 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON] (discussing “how we
should understand and protect privacy in light of . . . profound technological
developments”); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1441 (2001) (arguing that “[a] new
concept of accountability—‘network accountability’—is needed to address the shortcomings
of fusion centers,” which are governmental sites that collect and share information); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) (discussing
new technologies that allow for easier and cheaper data collection and arguing that, “when
possible, the law should facilitate informational privacy”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big
Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and
Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595 (2004)
(“Lawmakers should revisit federal privacy laws to account for private-sector database
companies that sell personal information to the government for law enforcement
purposes.”); Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of
Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 140 (2006) (arguing that “a new common law tort
should be used to force reform and accountability on data traders, and to provide remedies
for individuals who have suffered harm to their core privacy interests of choice and
control”); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 119
(2004) (arguing for a theory of “contextual integrity,” which would “tie[ ] adequate
protection for privacy to norms of specific contexts, demanding that information gathering
and dissemination be appropriate to that context and obey the governing norms of
distribution within it”); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2010) (discussing
possible ways to remedy the problem that “scientists . . . can often ‘reidentify’ or
‘deanonymize’ individuals hidden in anonymized data with astonishing ease”); Neil M.
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (2008) (discussing “the protection of
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including excessive government and commercial entity
surveillance, breach of confidentiality, misuse of personal
information for such things as denial of employment or insurance
benefits, damage to reputation, blackmail, loss of anonymity,
chilled speech or association, and extreme emotional distress.19
Thankfully, privacy has been valued by many courts and
lawmakers. Notwithstanding the difficulty in defining privacy, it
has been recognized, to varying degrees, as a civil right both in the
United States and in other nations.
The European Union
explicitly views privacy as a human right.20 The European Union
records of our intellectual activities—and how legal protection of these records is essential
to the First Amendment values of free thought and expression”); Neil M. Richards, The
Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1087 (2006) [hereinafter Richards,
Information Privacy] (discussing and assessing “the emergence of ‘The Information Privacy
Law Project,’ a group of scholars focused on the legal issues raised by the increasing
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information made possible by evolving digital
technologies”); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 913 (2007) (arguing that current requirements that
companies disclose security breaches involving personal information are insufficient and
proposing more effective notification processes for such breaches); Paul M. Schwartz,
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2055 (2004) (developing “a
model of propertized personal information that responds to . . . serious concerns about
privacy”); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
343, 345 (2008) (arguing that “data mining’s security benefits require more scrutiny, and
[that] the privacy concerns are significantly greater than currently acknowledged”).
19 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1131
(2011) (describing privacy violations as falling into “objective” and “subjective” categories);
Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 8, at 478 (arguing for “[a] new taxonomy to understand
privacy violations”).
20 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1(1),
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (stating that people have a “right to privacy with respect to the
processing of personal data”); see also PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR
BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY
DIRECTIVE, at vii (1998) (discussing the European Union Directive “designed to improve
privacy protection in its member countries”); Fred H. Cate, European Court of Human
Rights Expands Privacy Protections: Copeland v. United Kingdom, 11 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
INSIGHT (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.asil.org/insights070806.cfm (discussing
recent case in which protections of personal information were extended); Joel R.
Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 731 (2001)
(“Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in fundamental human rights.”);
Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal
Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 448 (1995) (noting that “democratic society cannot and will not
function without rules governing the processing of personal data”).
See generally
Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European Union’s Directive: The Challenge for the
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Data Protection Directive of 1995 imposes a number of obligations
on the processors of personal data, including the requirement that
processors obtain unambiguous consent from the individual for the
transfer of certain data.21 The directive gives individuals the right
to exert some control over the use of data about them, the right to
be notified about personal information collection, the right to
correct inaccurate information, the right to object to the use or
transfer of information, and the right not to be subject to certain
automated decisions.22
In the United States, certain aspects of privacy have been
explicitly protected, such as the right to be free from unreasonable
government search and seizure23 and the right to anonymity.24
Numerous statutes have been enacted to preserve an individual’s
privacy.25 The common law provides multiple actions in tort to
United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995) (discussing the EU Data Protection Directive and
its impact on the United States).
21 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 7(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40.
22 Council Directive 95/46/EC, arts. 7, 10, 12, 14–15, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40–43.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of government intrusion”);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”); cf. Reidenberg, supra
note 20, at 730–31 (“While there is a consensus among democratic states that information
privacy is a critical element of civil society, the United States has, in recent years, left the
protection of privacy to markets rather than law.”).
25 See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006)
(protecting the confidentiality of consumers’ financial information from the government);
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2006) (noting “[t]here is a need to
insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities
with . . . respect for the consumer’s right to privacy”); Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006) (requiring parental consent for a website to
gather personal information about a child under the age of thirteen); Video Voyeurism
Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006) (criminalizing the capturing of an image of
a private area of an individual without their consent when the individual has reasonable
expectation of privacy); Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522 (2006) (guarding privacy rights from infringement by wire or electronic
communication intercepting devices); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2712 (2006) (criminalizing obtaining, altering, or preventing authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication in electronic storage via unauthorized access to a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided); Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2006) (criminalizing certain unauthorized uses of
personal information obtained from a motor vehicle record); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2006) (regulating the gathering of
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vindicate one’s privacy rights.26 Social science has long supported
the fundamental and intrinsic need for privacy in our everyday
lives, most recently on the Internet.27 In short, the protection of
our privacy in the digital age is essential.28
The challenge with privacy protection in the law, particularly
with respect to the Internet, is implementation.29 Internet privacy
laws that are defined too narrowly fail to address the complete
array of privacy problems. Yet if Internet privacy laws are too
broad, they become either meaningless or too difficult to enforce
effectively.
The result is that a single approach likely is
inadequate to address the full range of current privacy problems.30
electronic surveillance of foreign entities); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–
300ii (2006)) (regulating the use of information gathered from health insurance
information); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)) (protecting consumers
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices).
26 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (1977) (describing the torts
of intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, public disclosure of private
facts, and public placing person in false light).
27 See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975)
(analyzing the interaction between privacy, crowding, territory, and personal space);
ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
GATHERINGS (1963) (discussing how people form perceptions of others through outward
manifestations of personal characteristics); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF
IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (same); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS
OF DISCLOSURE (2002) (analyzing individual privacy in a context of disclosure and
nondisclosure of private information); WESTIN, supra note 8 (discussing methods for
protecting privacy in an age where technology makes gathering private information
increasingly easy); danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of
Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119,
131–32 (David Buckingham ed., 2008) (discussing how teenagers manage the privacy of
their public images on social networking sites).
28 See, e.g., SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 18, at 2 (exploring how old conceptions
of privacy are not suited for understanding and protecting privacy in an Information Age);
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970 (2003) (“Given the development of technologies that
permit extensive data gathering and dissemination, deciding how to regulate the disclosure
of personal information is a vital issue.”).
29 See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and
on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (providing a descriptive account of the
implementation of privacy management and arguing for improvement in privacy
regulations).
30 See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 18, at 1466 (noting that, while no single solution may
exist, a combination of legal approaches may alleviate some of the concerns in Internet
privacy law).
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If privacy is to be effectively protected by the law, it must be
done through a combination of statutory law, common law, equity,
and administrative doctrines.
While our current privacy
protection regime is a patchwork of laws and remedies, the regime
is often muddled or in conflict with other laws and evolving
technology.31 Many of the current privacy protections focus on the
nature or use of personal information. For example, several
privacy remedies, such as the public disclosure of private facts and
false light torts, only restrict information that is “highly offensive
to a reasonable person.”32 Privacy laws limiting the collection or
disclosure of certain kinds of information or laws that are based on
particular kinds of technology seem to create the most confusion.33
These approaches have merit, but it is dangerous for privacy
laws to place too much reliance on the inconsistently applied
standard of “private” information or subjective tests like
“reasonable expectations of privacy.”34 Approaches that focus on
the nature of the information are problematic because personal
information is usually not seen as strictly private or public.35 The
31 See James T. O’Reilly, Homeland Security and the Future of Privacy Rights: A
Commentary, 55 FED. LAW. 54, 54 (June 2008) (attributing the conflicting body of laws to a
lack of sustained public interest in privacy).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D, 652E (1977).
33 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2006) (classifying all regulated communication into three types: “wire communication,” “oral
communication,” and “electronic communication”); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1571–72 (2004) (pointing out that
the complicated body of electronic privacy law is confusing both for laypersons and for
lawyers). See generally Symposium, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to
Discuss Internet Surveillance, Privacy & the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139
(2004) (discussing internet surveillance, privacy, and the USA Patriot Act to help define the
field of Internet surveillance law); ECPA Reform: Why Now?, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://
www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163
(last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (“[ECPA] has not undergone a significant revision since it was
enacted in 1986—light years ago in Internet time. As a result, ECPA is a patchwork of
confusing standards that have been interpreted inconsistently by the courts, creating
uncertainty for both service providers and law enforcement agencies.”).
34 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511
(2010) (arguing that the “reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abandoned”).
35 See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 90 (2010) (scrutinizing the different meanings of public and
private depending upon the arena of discussion); Nissenbaum, supra note 18, at 132
(explaining that “[i]nterpretations of what counts as a private space may vary across times,
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same piece of information can be considered sensitive in some
circumstances and completely benign in others. Approaches that
focus on the use of information are better because the use of
information is what often leads to privacy harms.36 Additionally,
any law aimed at the suppression of a particular kind of
expression is suspect under the First Amendment.37 Thus, any
scheme for protecting privacy in an online environment should be
manageable, effective, clearly defined, and constitutionally valid.
The concept of chain-link confidentiality could meet all of these
demands.
A. THE PROMISE IN EVOLVING CONFIDENTIALITY

The subtext behind the recent proposals to protect privacy is
that the traditional privacy remedies are inadequate in the digital
age. The aggregated, searchable, and semi-permanent nature of
online information has allowed anyone with access to the Internet
the power of unlimited distribution and perfect recall. This titanic
shift in the way we disclose and receive information on the
Internet has magnified an individual’s potential privacy harms.38
The idea of Prosser’s four privacy torts serving as the chief legal
mechanisms to protect online privacy almost seems quaint.39
societies, and cultures”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can
Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 692–94 (evaluating the historical
conflation of privacy and secrecy); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2005) (arguing for an empirical approach in
determining whether certain information should be considered private or public).
36 See Calo, supra note 19, at 1133 (arguing that one of two categories of privacy harm “is
the unanticipated or coerced use of information concerning a person against that person”).
37 See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 112–14 (2000) (finding that “miscellaneous”
privacy torts, such as the tort of disclosure of embarrassing facts, frequently run into First
Amendment issues); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1122 (2000) (arguing that all restrictions on speech, even against highly embarrassing
or valueless speech, raise strong doctrinal problems); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291,
311–20 (1983) (describing the Court’s great skepticism towards forbidding truthful or
improperly motivated speech).
38 See Citron, supra note 2, at 69–70 (observing that twenty-first century technologies
have intensified mental and reputational injuries, multiplied financial injuries, and
exacerbated physical injuries).
39 See id. at 89 (arguing that traditional tort law is not a sufficient response to online
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Professor Susan Gilles observed that the privacy torts have “had a
far from happy life.”40 The torts, as well as a number of statutes
designed to protect privacy, are too vague, too subjective, or too
technology-dependent and, thus, outdated. Privacy scholars have
suggested modifying the privacy torts,41 passing new legislation,
altering existing statutes,42 or simply giving up on the concept of
privacy and embracing our new transparent society.43
One of the most promising alternatives to the oft-maligned
privacy torts that scholars have proposed is the law of
confidentiality.44 Professors Neil Richards and Daniel Solove
abuse and that civil rights laws should be enforced in that context); Richards, supra note 1,
at 357 (arguing that as “interpreted by [ ] Prosser, tort privacy is a poor vehicle for
grappling with problems of privacy and reputation in the digital age”); Singleton, supra note
37, at 118–19 (describing multiple bills pending in Congress to regulate Internet privacy);
Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 362 (recognizing that common law private-facts torts do not
effectively address new privacy questions arising from the exchange of computerized
information).
40 Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
41 See, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2007) (“By reconceptualizing the tort without reference to space,
this Article aims to articulate and support a practicable, factor-driven approach to the
public disclosure tort . . . .”); Ludington, supra note 18, at 140 (arguing “that the existing
scheme of common law privacy torts should be expanded to create a new tort for
information misuse”); Joseph Elford, Note, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A “Hierarchy
of Rights” Approach to the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 729 (1995) (advocating a
method-focused approach to the private-facts tort).
42 See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 954 (2010) (“[L]egal rules could improve online-privacy
regulation by recognizing reasonable expectations of privacy even in public spaces
traditionally unprotected by privacy torts; better protecting confidential relationships; and
allowing ‘individuals to exercise greater control over their personal information, . . . after it
has been exposed’ to other people or even to the general public.” (quoting DANIEL SOLOVE,
THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 188 (2007))
(internal footnotes omitted)).
43 See, e.g., DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 3–5 (1998) (advocating an embrace of inevitable
transparency as a way to empower citizens).
44 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and
Social Change, 1890–1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1133–34 (1992) (“[T]he legal emphasis
on controls over publication [should] be shifted to a duty of confidentiality imposed on those
possessing private information.”); Gilles, supra note 40, at 14–15 (“American law is in the
process of recognizing three distinct theories—contract, fiduciary duty and perhaps tort—
which can be used to found an action against a confidant who reveals information.”); Jerry
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1193–94
(1998) (arguing for a default rule that allows for only the “functionally necessary”
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argued in an influential article embracing confidentiality law that
“Warren and Brandeis rejected confidentiality as too restrictive
and narrow a basis for protecting privacy, but they did not
envision just how flexibly the concept could be used.”45 Gilles
noted that, given the bleak future of the privacy torts, “some have
advocated that American courts take a second look at breach of
confidence and assess its ability to protect privacy.”46
Compared to the concept of privacy, confidentiality is relatively
straightforward. Black’s Law Dictionary defines confidentiality as
processing of personal information unless the parties expressly agree otherwise); Andrew J.
McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied
Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 888 (2006) (proposing that an implied
contract of confidentiality arises in intimate relationships that the parties will not
disseminate private information through mass communication); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy
as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2000) (urging the adoption of certain
trade secrecy laws to protect personal information online); Sandeen, supra note 35, at 697
(advocating for the application of the relative secrecy doctrine to the protection of personal
information); Jay Weiser, Measure of Damages for Violation of Property Rules: Breach of
Confidentiality, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 76 (2002) (explaining that property rules
should be used to protect confidentiality); Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The
HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 619 (2002) (arguing that
breach of confidentiality can provide an effective remedy for the improper disclosure of
health information); Steven A. Bibas, Note, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 605–06 (1994) (advocating a contractual solution to data and
privacy problems); Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving
Toward a Common-Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 (1993) (arguing that
courts should provide a common law remedy for disclosures to third parties in the
employer–employee context); G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured
Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2392 (1992) (advocating for a
legally enforceable duty of confidentiality that attaches when a person engages in an
unauthorized publication of information); Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1426 (1982) (concluding that the basis for imposing
liability for breach of confidence should be the disclosure of information revealed in the
course of a nonpersonal relationship of a sort customarily understood to carry an obligation
of confidentiality).
45 Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 173; see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards,
Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1669 (2009) (“[T]he
realist critique of the distinctions between tort, contract, and property suggests that the
formalist approach is not as clear-cut as it might at first seem.”).
46 Gilles, supra note 40, at 9 (footnote omitted); see also Bezanson, supra note 44, at 1174
(“I suggest that the privacy tort be formally interred, and that we look to the concept of
breach of confidence to provide legally enforceable protection from dissemination of
identified types of personal information.”); Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 363 (“More
thought should also be given to increasing the use of legal sanctions for the violation of
special confidential relationships, in order to give individuals greater control over the
dissemination of personal information.” (footnote omitted)).
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“the state of having the dissemination of certain information
restricted.”47 Ethicist Sissela Bok defined confidentiality as “the
boundaries surrounding shared secrets and . . . the process of
guarding these boundaries. While confidentiality protects much
that is not in fact secret, personal secrets lie at its core.”48 The law
will impose an obligation of confidentiality on recipients of
information when they have agreed not to share the information
with third parties or when they receive information within the
context of a confidential relationship.49 Obligations or privileges of
confidentiality are found in multiple areas of the law in the United
States,
including
express
and
implied
contracts
for
50
confidentiality, the still-developing tort of breach of confidence,51
evidentiary privileges regarding confidentiality,52 procedural
protections like protective orders to prevent the disclosure of
embarrassing personal information in court records,53 and statutes
explicitly creating confidential relationships.54

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 339 (9th ed. 2009).
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 119 (1982).
49 Solove & Richards, supra note 45, at 1669 (“There are also other confidentiality rules
not involving civil liability, such as criminal prohibitions on divulging certain kinds of
confidential information, evidentiary privileges restricting testimony about confidential
data, and statutory protections that limit the release of confidential information by certain
companies or government agencies.” (footnote omitted)).
50 See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 44, at 908–11 (advocating the adoption of contract
remedies for breach of implied or express confidentiality agreements).
51 See, e.g., Vickery, supra note 44, at 1448–52 (examining the scope of the emerging tort
of breach of confidence).
52 See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 134–35 (discussing the recognition of
evidentiary privileges for confidential information in U.S. case law).
53 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (authorizing protective orders “to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression”); see also Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006) (providing an exemption from the disclosure of
personnel and medical files if the disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy”).
54 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006)
(regulating the collection, dissemination, and use of consumer information); Financial
Services Modernization (Gramm–Leach–Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006)
(requiring financial institutions to provide each customer with a notification about their
privacy rights at the time the consumer is established and annually thereafter); Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2006) (preventing the disclosure of
rental records of videos or other audiovisual materials); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-8 (2006) (regulating the
disclosure of information related to an individual’s health care).
47
48
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Typically, obligations of confidentiality arise through voluntary
promises or agreements to respect designated information. They
are also created through consensual confidential relationships.55
Confidentiality agreements are legally binding agreements that
are commonly used to prohibit the disclosure of information. 56
Such contracts are used to protect anonymity, arbitration
proceedings,57 settlement agreements,58 and trade secrets.59
Additionally, these contracts may protect sensitive information
such as health information, sexual preferences, intimate feelings,
and other pieces of similarly personal information.60 Even quasicontractual promises of confidentiality are enforceable if disclosers
of information rely on them to their detriment.61
In addition to confidentiality agreements, an obligation of
confidentiality may be created by entering into a confidential or
fiduciary relationship.
The law of equity has traditionally
designated certain relations, such as principal–agent and trustee–
beneficiary, as “fiduciary.”62 Gilles wrote that “[w]here such a
relation exists, a fiduciary is under a duty ‘to act for the benefit of
Gilles, supra note 40, at 15.
See id. (“Express written contracts, binding the signer to hold information confidential,
have long been used in the commercial area, particularly by employers to prevent
employees from revealing business secrets.”).
57 See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1211, 1212 (2006) (describing the value of confidentiality agreements in arbitration
proceedings).
58 See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 286 (1999) (noting
that courts permit confidentiality agreements to encourage parties to settle).
59 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 44, at 1152 (explaining how a confidentiality
agreement to protect trade secrets typically works).
60 See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
(holding that a contract between a doctor and a patient contains an implied condition for
the doctor not to release any confidential information gained through the contractual
relationship without the patient’s permission); Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 136–38
(discussing early cases where courts created a legal remedy for divulging confidential
information based on implied contract).
61 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (applying
promissory estoppel where newspapers breached promises of confidentiality), on remand
from 501 U.S. 663 (1991). Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to enforce
promises that are detrimentally relied upon even though the formal elements of a contract
are not present. Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and
Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 909 (2009).
62 Gilles, supra note 40, at 39.
55
56
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the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the
relation.’ This duty, often characterized as the ‘duty of loyalty,’
includes an obligation not to reveal information.”63
Like confidentiality agreements, the existence of a confidential
relationship is a question of fact.64 Professor Roy Ryden Anderson
found that “confidential relationships have been labeled ‘factbased’ fiduciary relationships to distinguish them from formal
[fiduciary relationships].”65 Although professional relationships
such as doctor–patient and attorney–client relationships are the
most common types of confidential relationships, courts have
found many kinds of relationships to be confidential, including
friendships, business relationships, and familial relationships.66
Breach of these confidential relationships can, in some
instances, give rise to liability under the breach of confidence tort.
This tort, while well-developed in England, is limited in the United
States.67 The tort is deceptively simple, as “[c]ourts impose
liability under the tort when a person discloses information that
he received in confidence.”68 While the tort has been most
successful with regard to professional relationships, liability can
63 Id. at 39–40 (quoting AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 2.5 (4th ed. 1987) (footnote omitted)).
64 Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential
Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315, 317 (2000).
65 Id. (footnote omitted).
66 See id. at 330 (noting the categories courts use in determining the existence of a
confidential relationship); see also GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TORTS
§ 482, at 284–86 (2d ed. 1981) (“Equity has never bound itself by any hard and fast
definition of the phrase ‘confidential relation’ and has not listed all the necessary elements
of such a relation, but has reserved discretion to apply the doctrine whenever it believes
that a suitable occasion has arisen.”). Gilles identified some factors that courts consider in
determining whether a confidential relation exits: “the length of time of the reliance, a
disparity in the positions of the parties, and a close relationship between the parties. It is
‘great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of power, and superiority of position’ that
evidence a confidential relation.” Id. (quoting BOGERT, supra, § 482, at 281, 287–319).
67 See Gilles, supra note 40, at 4–14 (tracing the English breach of confidence tort and the
American invasion of privacy tort to their common doctrinal ancestor); Harvey, supra note
44, at 2392–93 (noting the breach of confidence doctrine in England and stating American
courts’ basis for rejecting it); Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 156–58, 180 (discussing
how American courts have largely ignored the breach of confidentiality tort). See generally
PAUL STANLEY, THE LAW OF CONFIDENTIALITY: A RESTATEMENT (2008) (stating the
fundamental principles underlying the modern English law of confidentiality).
68 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 341 (1998).
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also occur “in an informal setting if the party receiving the
information either explicitly or implicitly agrees to keep the
information confidential.”69
From a doctrinal perspective, the law of confidentiality offers
many benefits over the common law privacy torts and current
privacy statutes. Under the law of confidentiality, courts can
largely avoid the difficult question of whether information was
private, newsworthy, or offensive, and focus instead on whether a
trust was breached.70 Information can typically be protected by a
duty of confidentiality without regard to the extent that it has
been disclosed to others.71 Additionally, the law of confidentiality
is less constitutionally suspect than the disclosure tort, which has
significant First Amendment limitations.72 The Supreme Court
Id. (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 178 (noting that confidentiality law
focuses on the source, rather than the content, of information); Winn, supra note 44, at 653–
54 (“Claims for invasion of privacy . . . are based on the misuse of the personal information
due to the sensitive and private nature of the information. On the other hand, breach of
confidentiality represents an injury to a relationship of trust between the injured person
and the person who has misused the information . . . .”).
71 See, e.g., Winn, supra note 44, at 657 (“[I]n the tort of breach of confidentiality, the
unauthorized revelation of confidential medical information is protected without regard to
the degree to which the information has been published to the general public.”). It is
important to note that some conceptions of confidentiality will not protect information that
is publicly available. See Abril, supra note 6, at 713 (“Fundamentally, a confidentiality
agreement cannot shield information that is publicly available.” (footnote omitted)); cf.
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that an obligation of
confidentiality can still exist even if information is publicly available if the discloser
somehow saved the recipient time and effort in disclosing the information or presented the
information in a more ready and usable form than what was publicly available). The
interpretation of “publicly available” also varies wildly, particularly online, and is outside
the scope of this Essay. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17–31) (arguing that the
public/private dichotomy provides an inadequate account of online privacy), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597745.
72 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Comment, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene
Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1561–63 (2000) (arguing
that fair information practices are a narrow exception to First Amendment limitations);
Singleton, supra note 37, at 98–114 (providing a historical overview of tensions between
privacy law and the First Amendment in the United States); Volokh, supra note 37, at
1122–23 (concluding that much of American privacy law presents unavoidable First
Amendment problems); Winn, supra note 44, at 658 (“There is no defense to an action for
breach of confidentiality that facts disclosed are of public interest.”); Zimmerman, supra
note 37, at 294 (stating that many justifications of the Warren–Brandeis right of privacy
“have often underplayed its serious constitutional problems”).
69
70
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ruled in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.73 that the First Amendment
does not bar an action for breach of a promise of confidentiality.74
Yet, confidentiality law also has flaws that might not make it a
good fit to protect online privacy.
As discussed below,
confidentiality law provides a remedy only against the initial
recipient of information. It does not provide a remedy against
third parties who are exposed to and use information downstream.
Unless an action is brought using the breach of confidence tort,
damages can only be collected under more limited recovery
regimes, such as contract law.75
Obligations imposed by confidentiality law may also be too
burdensome in realms where the free flow of information is
lauded, encouraged, and, in many contexts, necessary. The
traditional hallmark of confidentiality law is its role in locking
down information.
The obligations of those bound to
confidentiality are often simple and strict: do not disclose the
information received in confidence. While confidentiality works
remarkably well in many instances, it might over-protect
information if it were to be widely adopted online and unduly
inhibit the flow of information. Chain-link confidentiality can
alleviate the friction here between lockdown and unrestrained
publicity. No environment for disclosure could benefit from this
compromise more than the Internet.
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR PRIVITY ONLINE

In suggesting confidentiality law as a potential alternative to
Prosser’s privacy torts, Professor Danielle Keats Citron also noted
that a confidentiality approach has important limits. Citron
observed that “[b]ecause it requires the existence of a relationship
to which it is reasonable to impose duties of confidence, it would
likely not apply to data brokers and others who lack a relationship

501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Id. at 670.
75 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 40, at 3 (noting that the “formal requirements and
inadequate damages” of contract remedies render them less attractive than a breach of
confidence tort).
73
74
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with individuals whose information they release.”76 Richards and
Solove also noted the limitations of confidentiality law:
As Warren and Brandeis themselves recognized over a
century ago, breach of confidence is a poor cause of
action to assert against strangers who take and
publish nonconsensual photographs of people. An
action for breach of confidence protects information
given by the confider to the confidant, but not
information communicated outside that relationship.
Thus, a third party can freely disclose private facts
about a person as long as the third party did not learn
the information from a confidant.77
In this important respect, confidentiality law as traditionally
conceived is of limited effectiveness. But, the effectiveness of
confidentiality law need not be limited online. This Essay posits
that the Internet is capable of creating a multitude of confidential
relationships among users—thus making confidentiality law a
more attractive remedy to protect Internet users than other,
vaguer, “privacy”-centered rules.
In an important article on the protection of digitized medical
information, U.S. Department of Justice attorney Peter Winn
defended the idea that confidentiality law can be a viable legal
means to protect electronic health care information.78 Winn
observed that the federal Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information (the HIPAA Privacy Rules), which
establish confidentiality obligations for health care providers, do
not apply to “numerous [business associates] whose access to
personal health information has exploded with the increased use of
electronic health information.”79 The drafters of the HIPAA
Privacy Rules recognized this problem80—which is endemic to all
of confidentiality law—that downstream users of information are
Citron, supra note 5, at 1850 (footnote omitted).
Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 178.
78 See generally Winn, supra note 44 (advocating confidentiality law as a means of
protecting medical records).
79 Id. at 618.
80 Id. at 651.
76
77
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not bound by confidentiality. This flaw seemingly threatened to
undercut the effectiveness of the HIPAA Privacy Rules.81 After all,
what good is it to require one recipient to maintain confidentiality
if numerous other recipients are not bound to protect the same
information?
According to Winn, the drafters were able to take advantage of
a simple fact: “virtually all access by business associates to
personal health information originates with healthcare providers
and payers.”82 Based on this fact, the drafters created a prototype
for this Essay’s conception of chain-link confidentiality, which is
addressed in greater detail in Part III. The HIPAA Privacy Rules
provide that, although only covered entities such as healthcare
providers are bound to confidentiality, these entities may not
disclose information to their business associates without executing
a written contract that places the business associate under the
same confidentiality requirements as the healthcare providers.83
According to Winn, since all health information “derives ultimately
from healthcare providers who are in turn under a duty of
confidentiality to the individual patient, the Rules thus put
business associates under a contractual obligation that makes
them agents of the covered entities . . . with the same duties of
confidentiality.”84 This linking of parties creates a chain, and the
law requires that privacy obligations follow information after an
initial disclosure to a covered entity along that chain.85
This Essay proposes applying the logic similar to that employed
by Winn and the developers of the HIPAA Privacy Rules to
personal information online. Nearly all access by third parties to
personal information on the Internet originates with two kinds of
81 See id. (“[F]ailure to address the responsibilities of business associates within the
system of disclosures of personal health information would vitiate the effectiveness of the
[HIPAA Privacy] Rules themselves . . . .”).
82 Id.
83 Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2001)). Congress recently amended HIPAA with the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). 42 U.S.C.
§§ 17921–17953 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). HITECH amends the HIPAA Privacy Rules as an
attempt to improve the privacy and security of electronic health information. Catherine
Walberg, How HITECH Are You? New HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule Requirements, J.
KAN. B. ASS’N, Sept. 2010, at 22, 23.
84 Winn, supra note 44, at 651.
85 Id.

678

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:657

entities: (1) Internet service providers (ISPs) and (2) softwarebased recipients, such as websites and software applications that
utilize the Internet.86 Because the original recipient of selfdisclosed personal information on the Internet is largely
discoverable87—via the website visited and the ISP used—a chain
of confidentiality is possible. Although the number of potential
recipients of personal information seems overwhelming, the reality
is less daunting. Online, individuals have more opportunities for
confidentiality, and they disclose information to fewer initial
recipients, or “gatekeepers,” than one might think.88
At its core, the Internet is a tool that connects people to one
another and, perhaps just as importantly, to websites and entities.
The core purpose of the most integral Internet feature, the
hyperlink, is to connect one source to another. These connections
all represent opportunities for confidential relationships and
confidentiality agreements.
Although individuals disclose great amounts of personal
information online, they disclose it to a surprisingly small number
of websites. As a result, the majority of personal information on
the Internet initially goes to a relatively small number of
recipients. If confidentiality protections can effectively protect the

86 See The Tracking Ecosystem, WALL ST. J., http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/documents/divSl
ider/ecosystemms100730.html (last accessed Dec. 17, 2011) (illustrating how tracking files
log your online activity so that websites can provide individualized feedback and
advertisements); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How to Avoid the Prying Eyes, WALL ST. J.,
July 31–Aug. 1, 2010, at W3 (“Visitors to almost every major website are tracked online.”).
This monitoring can occur through information submitted directly to a website or through
the use of tracking technologies such as a cookie or beacon. See Julia Angwin, The Web’s
New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 30–Aug. 1, 2010, at W1 (“Beacons, also
known as ‘Web bugs’ and ‘pixels,’ are small pieces of software that run on a Web page. They
can track what a user is doing on the page, including what is being typed or where the
mouse is moving.”); Julia Angwin & Tom McGinty, Personal Details Exposed Via Biggest
U.S. Websites, WALL ST. J., July 30–Aug. 1, 2010, at A1 (“The largest U.S. websites are
installing new and intrusive consumer-tracking technologies on the computers of people
visiting their sites—in some cases, more than 100 tracking tools at a time . . . .”).
87 See, e.g., Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J., July 31–Aug. 1, 2010, at W3
(explaining the methodology in analyzing the United States’ fifty most popular websites for
the presence of Internet tracking technologies).
88 While cookies and other tracking technologies are used simultaneously with a visit to a
website, this Essay does not treat them as the initial recipient of information since their
legitimate installation is dependent upon a prior implantation by the visited website.
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information held by that minority of websites, the lion’s share of
private information can be protected on the Internet.
The amount of information online is staggering.89 Thankfully,
under confidentiality law, the amount of information that is
disclosed is largely not important. The focus is not what or how
much is being disclosed, but rather, on who receives the disclosure.
Nielsen—a leader in consumer surveys on media consumption—
estimated that the average Internet user visited around eighty-six
domains in June 2010.90 Even on a website likely to receive
copious amounts of personal information, such as Facebook,91 the
average adult user has about 229 “friends.”92 Anyone with access
to a profile receives that information from one source: Facebook.
In this way, Facebook is similar to the covered entities under
HIPAA as the source of personal information.93
Websites also collect personal information that an Internet user
might not know is being disclosed, collected, or stored.94 Websites
89 According to Pingdom, an Internet monitoring company, 1.97 billion Internet users
browsed 255 million websites and sent 107 trillion emails in 2010 alone. Internet 2010 in
Numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-innumbers/. Of course, 89.1% of the e-mails were spam. Id.
90 June 2010: Top Online Sites and Brands in the U.S., NIELSENWIRE (July 16, 2010),
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/june-2010-top-online-sites-and-brands-inthe-u-s/.
91 Facebook is an Internet website where users interact with “friends.” Friends are user
profiles with whom the social network user shares a connection. See danah m. boyd &
Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 210–11 (2008) (describing the variations among social
network sites). For example, one definition for social network sites, which are a type of
online community, is “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom
they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made
by others within the system.” Id. at 211.
92 KEITH HAMPTON ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND OUR LIVES:
HOW PEOPLE’S TRUST, PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND CIVIC AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
ARE CONNECTED TO THEIR USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND OTHER TECHNOLOGIES 5
(June 16, 2011).
93 Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.130 (2010) (defining covered entities under HIPAA).
94 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy ‘Supercookies,’ WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 2011, at A1 (“Major websites such as MSN.com and Hulu.com have been tracking people’s
online activities using powerful new methods that are almost impossible for computer users to
detect . . . .”). Researchers claimed that new techniques “reach beyond the traditional ‘cookie,’
a small file that websites routinely install on users’ computers to help track their activities
online. Hulu and MSN were installing files known as ‘supercookies,’ which are capable of recreating users’ profiles after people deleted regular cookies.” Id.
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use cookies95 to collect information on the website’s users, and
websites may allow third parties to deploy third-party cookies as
well.96 The relationship between websites and third-party cookie
users is yet another opportunity for confidentiality protections.
Websites that use cookies, Web bugs,97 and other data collection
technologies have access to a host of information, including
comprehensive browsing and search histories, payment
information, and contact information such as addresses, phone
Solove and others have
numbers, and e-mail addresses.98
thoroughly documented the harms that can result from the
disclosure of this information,99 such as the compilation of a
95 “Cookies are bits of encrypted information deposited on a computer’s hard drive after
the computer has accessed a particular Web site.” SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT, TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO REWRITE THE RULES
7 (Aug. 20, 2000).
96 See, e.g., Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A
Framework for the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 89 (2002)
(“An advertising company can use . . . any website . . . to set a cookie to a user’s computer
that can then be read across other websites and interact with the advertiser’s web server.
Because an advertiser’s cookie is set when the user is visiting another entity’s website, it is
often referred to as a ‘third-party cookie.’ ” (footnotes omitted)); Tracking the Trackers: Our
Method, supra note 87, at W3 (“HTML cookies are small text files, installed on a user’s
computer by a website, that assign the user’s computer a unique identity and can track the
user’s movements on a site. Flash cookies are used in conjunction with Adobe Systems’
Flash software, which is widely used to display graphics and video on websites. Beacons
are bits of software code on a site that can transmit data about a user’s browsing
behavior.”). The problem of cookies should be separated from the more general problem of
“spyware,” which is “a broad term used to describe software that resides on a user’s
computer and monitors the user’s online behavior.” Richard G. Kunkel, Protecting
Consumers from Spyware: A Proposed Consumer Digital Trespass Act, 28 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 185, 185 (2010). The larger issues of spyware usually involve
complex issues of deceit and consent and are beyond the scope of this Article. See also
Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to
Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1545–48 (2006) (discussing whether
contractual consent to continual surveillance should be unenforceable as a matter of public
policy).
97 Web bugs are similar to cookies in that they are “electronic tags that help Web sites
and advertisers track visitors’ whereabouts in cyberspace. But Web bugs are invisible on
the page and are much smaller [than cookies].” Stefanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable
Tracking Device Raises Concern, CNET (July 12, 2000, 3:05 PM PDT), http://news.cnet.com/
2100-1017-243077.html.
98 See generally Angwin, supra note 86 (discussing the types of personal information
collected by such devices).
99 See generally SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 8; Hoofnagle, supra note
18 (describing privacy and due process risk where personal information is accessed and
sold).

2012]

CHAIN-LINK CONFIDENTIALITY

681

“digital dossier” that, if disclosed, could result in identity theft,
government surveillance, wrongful denial of employment or
insurance coverage, a chilling effect on speech or association, or
emotional harm.100
This kind of sensitive, aggregated information has driven
lawmakers, courts, scholars, the media, and the general public to
call for greater privacy protections. The U.S. Senate, for example,
has proposed a regulatory framework to minimize the collection of
personal data, to improve constraints on the distribution of such
data, and to maintain the accuracy of stored data.101 The vast
majority of the information this framework would protect online,
however, would still come from two initial sources: ISPs and
websites.102 It would make sense, then, to fashion rules aimed
squarely at these sources.
III. THE CHAIN-LINK CONFIDENTIALITY APPROACH
The general thesis of this Essay is that a chain-link
confidentiality approach could be an effective way for the law to
protect Internet users’ personal information.
While such
protections should be supplemented by other laws, such as
surveillance statutes103 and privacy-related torts,104 chain-link
confidentiality could be a meaningful concept within a privacy
protection regime. The previous section discussed the challenge of
policing the downstream use of information and the promise of
confidentiality on the Internet. This part will introduce the theory

100 See, e.g., Richards, Information Privacy, supra note 18, at 1097 (discussing the
problems created by information disclosure, including identity theft); Daniel J. Solove, The
First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 148 (2007) (canvassing the
potential negative results of public disclosure of personal information).
101 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong., Tit. III (2011).
102 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. An ISP has been defined as a “firm in the
business of providing Internet services to home or business customers, or sometimes other
ISPs.” JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 188 (2006).
103 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522,
2701–2709 (2006).
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (covering the four privacy torts:
intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life,
and publicity placing person in false light).
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of chain-link confidentiality and explore various methods of
implementation.
A. THEORY

A chain-link confidentiality regime would allow for the limited
disclosure of personal information as long as certain obligations to
respect data followed the information as it was disclosed
downstream. Chain-link confidentiality could be most useful to
protect self-disclosed personal information. This is a notable
strength. Perhaps the most significant failure of the application of
privacy torts to the Internet is their failure to protect self-disclosed
information. Unlike Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis, who worried about tabloids publishing
private moments,105 the most likely publisher of personal
information in the Internet age may be the user herself.106 In light
of the mass adoption of social media and the pervasiveness of
electronically-mediated communication, Internet users seem to
have become their own worst enemies.107 Compounding this
problem is the fact that Internet users often do not even realize
that they are disclosing personal information.108 Even if they do
realize what they are disclosing, Internet users regularly feel like
they have no choice or negotiating power when they disclose their
personal information.109
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2009)
(discussing privacy issues regarding self-disclosed information on Facebook).
107 See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal
Investigation: ‘Scrapers’ Dig Deep for Data on Web, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2010, at A1 (“Many
scrapers and data brokers argue that if information is available online, it is fair game, no
matter how personal. ‘Social networks are becoming the new public records,’ says Jim
Adler, chief privacy officer of Intelius Inc., a leading paid people-search website.”).
108 See Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies? 17 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864 (“The entire population of adult
Americans exhibits a high level of online-privacy illiteracy . . . .”); Ashkan Soltani et al.,
Flash Cookies and Privacy 4 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=144682 (“Given the different storage characteristics of Flash
cookies, without disclosure of Flash cookies in a privacy policy, it is unclear how the average
user would even know of the technology.”).
109 See, e.g., Tony Vila et al., Why We Can’t Be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies: Models
of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market 1 (May 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
105
106
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Chain-link confidentiality can alleviate the tension between the
disclosure and safety of personal information via a chain of
protection. To create the chain of protection, contracts would be
used to link each new recipient of information to a previous
recipient who wished to disclose the information. These contracts
would contain at least three kinds of terms: (1) obligations and
restrictions on the use of the disclosed information, (2)
requirements to bind future recipients to the same obligations and
restrictions, and (3) requirements to perpetuate the contractual
chain—i.e., to contractually obligate future recipients to continue
the chain of contractual obligation if they wish to further disclose
the information.
A number of optional elements could also be included in a chain
contract, such as a requirement for documentation and a provision
designating the subject or original source of the information as a
third-party beneficiary.
To that end, a basic chain-link
confidentiality approach requires the same elements necessary to
form a contract: mutual assent, capacity, and consideration.110
This approach also requires some impetus to begin the chain of
protection, either through statute, regulation, or voluntarily
through an initial contract of confidentiality.
If the three
necessary elements of a chain contract are met, then ostensibly
each new recipient of information will be bound by the same
confidentiality as the initial recipient of information. Given the
proper restrictions on use, this approach could protect an
individual’s privacy while still allowing for the dissemination of
information online.
1. Obligations and Restrictions on the Use of Information.
Restrictions on the use of disclosed information constitute the
available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~greenie/econprivacy.pdf (“Others simply decide
that loss of privacy is an inevitable consequence of doing business these days.”); Public
Opinion on Privacy, supra note 3 (explaining results of various polls of public opinion
regarding online privacy); spde, Comment to Are You Also Confused About Online Privacy?,
TELEFONICA PUB. POL’Y BLOG (June 8, 2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.publicpolicy.telefonica.
com/blogs/blog/2011/06/08/are-you-also-confused-about-online-privacy/ (“Confused, yes! and
also concerned! Concerned by the antiprivacy [sic] type of terms and conditions that most
virtual services include in the contracts. . . . We want to be protected from abusive terms
and conditions that we cannot negotiate.”).
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 17, 18, 71 (1979) (defining the
contracts concepts).
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substance of a chain-link confidentiality regime. Here, the term
“confidentiality” must be interpreted more broadly than a mere
refrain from disclosing information.
Instead, confidentiality
should be construed, as one survey suggested, as “the obligation[ ]
of individuals and institutions to use information under their
control appropriately once it has been disclosed to them.”111
Indeed, to define confidentiality strictly as refraining from
disclosure would not work in a chain-link confidentiality regime.
The chain-link approach is designed to facilitate the limited
sharing of information. It is important to emphasize, however,
that the more restrictive conception of confidentiality would still
be vital if a chain-link approach was adopted. Some information is
so sensitive that it must be protected under the traditional and
more protective laws regarding confidentiality agreements and
confidential relationships. However, not all information on the
Internet is this sensitive or must be protected so absolutely.
Indeed, most personal information on the Internet is meant to be
shared, but it still needs to be protected in some way.
This is where the flexibility of a chain-link confidentiality
concept becomes useful. A number of obligations and restrictions
could be incorporated into the chain contracts to protect an
individual’s privacy. Solove and Lecturer in Residence Chris Jay
Hoofnagle have proposed a model regime of privacy protection
based on notice, consent, control, and access.112 These concepts
could be incorporated as terms in chain contracts. These terms
would then be the floor of protection for individuals whose
information is being transferred.
Responsible entities could
always provide additional protections, but the level of protection
would never drop below what was originally agreed upon for the
initial disclosure or collection of information by ISPs and websites.
Chain contracts could prohibit further dissemination of
personal information to particular parties, such as insurance
companies. They could also require background checks and only
111 Univ. of Miami School of Med., Privacy and Confidentiality, PRIVACY/DATA PROTECTION
PROJECT (last modified May 12, 2005), http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd_privacy_basi
cdef.htm.
112 Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 357, 368.
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permit sharing with “legitimate” organizations. An excellent
example of such a restriction is included in the proposed
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, which adopts a
similar approach to the European Union Data Directive Safe
Harbor (E.U. Data Directive) arrangement by prohibiting the
transfer of data to “unreliable third parties.”113
Indeed, the E.U. Data Directive, the U.S. Safe Harbor
Arrangement,114 the HIPAA Privacy Rules, and the proposed
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights provide numerous examples of
obligations or restrictions that could be included in chain
contracts, such as obligations of security, data integrity, access,
transparency, accountability, and notification of breach.115 The
security requirement, for example, could obligate the recipient to
keep the information secure from “unauthorized access, disclosure,
alteration, and destruction.”116 Regarding data integrity, the
contract could prohibit processing information in ways
incompatible with the purposes for which it was originally

113 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 302(a)(3), 302(b)
(2011) (defining “unreliable third parties” as any entity that the discloser knows has
violated a contract to protect information under the act or is “reasonably likely to violate
such a contract”); see also Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 45,668 (July 24, 2000) (prohibiting the onward transfer of
information to third parties that are not subject to the E.U. Data Directive or not bound by
a written agreement providing at least the same level of privacy protection required by the
relevant notice and choice principles); Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the
Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked
Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8
[hereinafter Commission Decision] (finding that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles provide adequate protection); 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2) (2011)
(stating the requirements for business associate contracts).
114 The U.S. Commerce Department has described the Safe Harbor arrangement as
a mechanism, which, through an exchange of documents, enables the EU to
certify that participating U.S. companies meet the EU requirements for
adequate privacy protection. Participation in the safe harbor is voluntary.
Organizations will need to adhere to the privacy requirements laid out in
the safe harbor documents for all received from the EU.
Press Release, Commerce Secretary William M. Daly Hails EU Approval of Safe Harbor
Privacy Arrangement (May 31, 2000), http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/000531/epf306.htm.
115 See supra note 113. Under the HITECH Act, covered entities must notify individuals
of any breach of privacy regarding unsecured protected health information. 42 U.S.C.
§ 17932(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
116 Commission Decision, supra note 113, at 12.
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collected.117 This obligation could include a promise not to
aggregate the data in a certain way or not to make the information
available online or in certain formats.118
A data integrity
requirement could further require recipients to “take reasonable
steps to ensure that [the transferred] data is reliable for its
intended use, accurate, complete, and current.”119
Terms in chain contracts could provide individuals with access
to personal information about them along with an opportunity to
correct or delete inaccurate information.
Terms could also
stipulate that notice be given to the individual regarding the use
and onward transfer of her personal information.120 To ensure
that recipients of personal information have the infrastructure to
comply with the requirements in a chain contract, terms could
restrict transfer to those entities that have adequate managerial
accountability, resources, and the capacity to respond to personal
inquiries about the collection, use, transfer, or storage of personal
To properly trace the chain of information,
information.121
contracts could require a centralized system of documentation of
the transfer122 and notification of any breaches of the terms to the
subjects of the information.
Chain contracts could also stipulate that information only be
shared if the collected data was anonymized, or that only certain
kinds of data, such as addresses or information found on public
profiles, could be shared.
Privacy and information policy
consultant Robert Gellman has proposed a statutory framework
that utilizes a chain-link theory based on contractual agreements
117 See id. (stipulating that “[a]n organization may not process personal information in a
way that is incompatible with the purposes for which it has been collected”).
118 Such a promise could be seen as an attempt to preserve the obscurity of information.
For more information on the benefits of online obscurity, see Hartzog & Stutzman, supra
note 71.
119 Commission Decision, supra note 113, at 12.
120 See id. at 11 (incorporating such requirements in the E.U. Data Directive).
121 See Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 102, 401
(2011) (proposing accountability standards for entities that have information regarding a
threshold member of individuals).
122 See id. § 201(a) (requiring data collectors to maintain information “in a form that
individuals can readily access”); Winn, supra note 44, at 651 (“The requirement of the
existence of a contract between the covered entity and the business associate also ensures
that the legal responsibility of the business associate with respect to confidentiality is
properly documented.” (footnote omitted)).
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that mandate anonymization of personal information and impose
prohibitions on reidentification.123 Information sharing could be
limited to third parties performing specific services or offering
some benefit to the subject of the information.
The individual merits of these obligations and restrictions are
beyond the scope of this Essay. Some terms will be more effective
and less problematic than others.124 Too many obligations and
restrictions in a chain contract would unduly burden the flow of
information. Too few would make the protection provided by the
contract meaningless. Thus, the terms must strike a proper
balance according to the context and proposed use of the
information. In any event, it is clear that a variety of mechanisms
currently exist to make chain contracts a flexible and meaningful
privacy protection for individuals.
2. Similarly Binding Future Recipients. After establishing the
initial recipient’s obligations and restrictions on the use of
personal information, the next step in a chain-link confidentiality
approach is to ensure that those same obligations and restrictions
will apply to future recipients of information. This step is
accomplished through a contract that requires the new third-party
recipient to agree to the same restrictions and obligations that
bind the initial recipient of personal information. This is the first
link in the chain of confidentiality.
Contracts are not the only means of linking privacy protections
with information. Property-based theories of privacy,125 as well as
direct restrictions on the collection and use of certain types of
information, also accomplish this goal. The use of chain contracts,
however, is preferable to these other approaches for a few reasons.
Perhaps most importantly, confidentiality law is not as suspect
under the First Amendment as other privacy remedies, such as the
tort of public disclosure of private facts. In one of the most
123 Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual
Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 47–49 (2010).
124 See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 20, at 733–34 (“Compliance with the national laws
[stemming from the E.U. Data Directive] has also been an issue in Europe. The notice and
registration requirements, in particular, appear to have a spotty reception.”).
125 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 44, at 1125 (proposing an approach to privacy laws
based on established trade secret laws addressing unfair competition); Schwartz, supra note
18, at 2056 (proposing a model of propertized personal information).
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influential articles on the topic, Professor Eugene Volokh
concluded that “information privacy rules are not easily defensible
under existing free speech law.”126 Volokh was particularly
troubled by the disclosure tort, which he saw as a content-based
restriction on speech.127 Other scholars have echoed this concern
about the constitutionality of privacy remedies.128 In response, the
law of confidentiality has received significant support as a
constitutional alternative to laws seeking to restrict the
publication of certain kinds of information.129 Richards and Solove
found that there is “support for the proposition that existing First
Amendment law is far more comfortable with enforcing
nondisclosure rules in the context of relationships, even those
involving the press.”130 Winn argued that “because the tort
doctrine of breach of confidentiality does not create rights of
privacy in information, itself, but protects information only in the
context of well-defined relationships, it is likely to survive critical
First Amendment review.”131 A contract-based system would also

126 Volokh, supra note 37, at 1049; cf. Schwartz, supra note 72, at 1559 (describing
Volokh’s article as “the clearest expression that we have of the conflict between free speech
and information privacy in the context of the First Amendment”).
127 See Volokh, supra note 37, at 1115–17 (expressing concern over the government
passing regulations that restrict more information than necessary to protect sensitive
private information).
128 See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 37, at 112–14 (noting that in privacy cases only false
information is actionable under the First Amendment, which creates a problem for attempts
to restrict publication of truthful information); Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 311–20
(describing the constitutional issues with punishing publication of truthful information).
129 See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 44, at 1135 (advancing an enforceable obligation of
confidentiality); Gilles, supra note 40, at 3 (suggesting that contract and fiduciary duty
versions of a breach of confidence remedy could survive judicial scrutiny); McClurg, supra
note 44, at 888 (proposing the existence of an implied contract of confidentiality in intimate
relationships); Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 173 (“[T]he First Amendment critiques
that have limited the privacy torts in the United States would have much less force when
applied to breaches of confidentiality.”); Winn, supra note 44, at 621 (concluding that breach
of confidentiality is likely to survive First Amendment review); Bibas, supra note 44, at 605,
609 (offering a contractual solution as a means of achieving more efficient privacy
protection); Fast, supra note 44, at 433 (offering breach of confidentiality as a framework to
build more effective privacy protections); Harvey, supra note 44, at 2392 (advocating an
enforceable duty of confidentiality to protect privacy while staying within the bounds of the
First Amendment); Vickery, supra note 44, at 1426 (developing a mechanism for the
emerging breach of confidence tort).
130 Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 179 (footnote omitted).
131 Winn, supra note 44, at 621.
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be more voluntary than strict property or information-based
approaches. Third parties that did not want to agree to the terms
of the chain contract could simply refuse to enter into an
agreement with the holders of personal information.
Contracts are also preferable to property- and informationbased privacy restrictions because of the established body of law
that can guide the development of the chain-link approach. A
regime giving individuals a property right in their own
information largely would be a new and untested system.132 There
already are a few examples of the chain-link approach in both
European and American law. The E.U. Data Directive and the
U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement have provisions requiring the use of
contracts to bind third parties in the onward transfer of personal
information.133 The United States entered into the Safe Harbor
Agreement to ensure compliance with the E.U. Data Directive’s
requirement that third countries could only receive personal
information collected under the Directive if they provide an
“adequate level of [data] protection.”134 The U.S. Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles stipulate that organizations bound by the
restrictions and obligations of the E.U. Data Directive are allowed
to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent,
but only if the organization
first either ascertains that the third party subscribes
to the [principles of the Safe Harbor Agreement] or is
subject to [the E.U. Data] Directive or another
adequacy finding or enters into a written agreement
with such third party requiring that the third party
provide at least the same level of privacy protection as

132 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129
(2000) (identifying a property rights model as a theoretically “new form of intellectual
property right in information”).
133 See Commission Decision, supra note 113, at 7 (demanding E.U. members transfer
personal data to other countries only if assured of an adequate level of protection by those
countries); Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 47,676 (July 24, 2000) (“[C]ompanies that want to avail themselves of
the proposed ‘safe harbor’ will have to certify that they will protect the information they
collect in accordance with prescribed guidelines.”).
134 Council Directive 95/46/EC, arts. 25–26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45–46.
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is required by the relevant [principles of the Safe
Harbor Agreement].135
Organizations that comply with the onward transfer
requirements are not held responsible when a third-party recipient
of information “processes it in a way contrary to any restrictions or
representations, unless the organization knew or should have
known the third party would process it in such a contrary way and
the organization has not taken reasonable steps to prevent or stop
such processing.”136
As was previously mentioned, the HIPAA Privacy Rules also
use a chain-link contract of confidentiality to allow limited
disclosure while protecting information.137 The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services issued these rules under the
authority of the Administrative Simplification provisions of
HIPAA.138 According to Winn:
Because the increased access to electronic personal
health information increases the danger of harmful
disclosure and misuse of that information, Congress, in
enacting HIPAA, authorized federal regulatory
protections for personal health information.
The
resulting Rules establish a federal floor of
protections . . . [and] establish a set of fair information
practices giving patients certain rights of notice,
access, security, and consent with respect to
disclosures of their personal health information that
were not ordinarily provided under traditional
common law doctrines of confidentiality.139

135 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://export.gov/safehar
bor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (last updated July 21, 2010).
136 Id.
137 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2) (2010) (requiring the business associate contract to
establish “the permitted and required uses and disclosures of such [personal health]
information”).
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2006) (establishing safeguards for health information).
139 Winn, supra note 44, at 618 (footnote omitted).
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The HIPAA Privacy Rules originally applied only to healthcare
providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses (“covered
entit[ies]”).140 These entities routinely need to share health
information with others in the healthcare industry, such as
business associates who provide “legal, accounting, administrative,
management, and oversight services to healthcare providers and
health plans.”141 In an innovative solution, the HIPAA Privacy
Rules provide for the disclosure of health information by covered
entities to business associates through the execution of a chain
contract.142 Specifically, “before a covered entity may grant access
to personal health information to a business associate, the covered
entity must obtain a written contract from the business associate
promising to adhere to the same confidentiality standards as the
covered entity.”143 In 2009, the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinic Health Act (HITECH)144 extended the HIPAA
Privacy Rules to apply with equal force to a covered entity’s
business associates, such as vendors, drug companies, and
insurance companies.145
The HITECH Act’s extension of
protection is laudable, but as a general model for the protection of
online information, it does not extend far enough.
The first draft of the proposed Commercial Privacy Bill of
Rights146 goes a step further and is perhaps the boldest attempt
yet to create a chain-link confidentiality regime. Senators John
Kerry and John McCain introduced this bill “[t]o establish a
regulatory framework for the comprehensive protection of personal
data for individuals.”147 One of the major provisions of this Bill is
to give the FTC rulemaking authority to create privacy regulations
and approve industry-created safe harbor programs.148 The Bill
would “generally require companies to notify consumers about the
collection of their data, and also allow them to opt out of having
45 C.F.R. § 164.504(g)(1) (2010).
Winn, supra note 44, at 618.
142 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)–(3) (2010) (setting forth the requirements for a contract
between a covered entity and business associate).
143 Winn, supra note 44, at 620.
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901–17953 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
145 Id. § 17931(a).
146 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011).
147 Id. at pmbl.
148 Id. § 201(a).
140
141
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data used by third parties, like ad networks.”149 The Bill would
provide for a number of other obligations and restrictions for
covered entities, such as requirements to anonymize data in
certain instances and to minimize the collection and retention of
data.150
The provisions of the Bill most relevant to this Essay are in
section 302, which details constraints on the distribution of
information. Under this section, any covered entity seeking to
distribute covered information must “require by contract that any
third party to which it transfers covered information use the
information only for purposes that are consistent with (A) the
provision of th[e] Act; and (B) as specified in the contract.”151
Essentially, the required contract must bind any third-party
recipients to the same obligations that bind the covered entity that
originally collected the information.
However, the Bill goes further and requires that the chain
contract must also prohibit the combination of unidentifiable
information “with other information in order to identify” an
individual without their consent.152 As previously discussed, the
Act would prohibit transfers to unreliable third parties and
require that covered entities “assure through due diligence that
the third party is a legitimate organization” and notify the FTC of
any material violations of the contract.153 Thus, the system of
chain-link contracts provided for in the Commercial Privacy Bill of
Rights not only extends the ground floor for privacy protections to
third-party recipients of information154 but also includes additional
provisions to protect information. Although this Bill is still in
draft form and subject to change, its initial iteration represents

149 Wendy Davis, Kerry Privacy Bill Could Impose ‘Major’ Obligations on Ad Networks,
ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:56 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/arti
cle/147282/.
150 S. 799 § 301. For a summary of the draft, see Christopher Wolf, Draft “Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011” Published, HOGAN LOVELLS CHRON. OF DATA PROTECTION
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2011/03/articles/consumer-privacy/draft-c
ommercial-privacy-bill-of-rights-act-of-2011-published/.
151 S. 799 § 302(a)(1).
152 Id. § 302(a)(2).
153 Id. § 302(a)(3)(A)–(B).
154 Id. § 302(c).
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the most significant chain-link confidentiality approach to
protecting privacy that lawmakers have articulated to date.
Chain-link contracts also have been used in other areas of the
law, such as intellectual property. The “Share Alike” principle
embedded in Creative Commons and open software licenses is a
good example. Creative Commons is an organization offering a
variety of copyright licenses that allow creators to choose the
degree to which others may use their work and the terms on which
it can be shared.155 Under the Share Alike provision, copyright
owners license others to do things like remix, tweak, and build
upon their work in a non-commercial way, as long as the users of
the work license their new creations under the identical terms
stipulated by the original copyright owner.156 Note that as long as
the Share Alike provision is operative, there is no need to
perpetuate the contractual chain because the intellectual property
owners retain property-based rights. Thus, copyright owners do
not have to rely upon a chain of contracts to assert the rights in
their work against downstream users.
The breach of confidence tort is also capable of binding thirdparty recipients of information in the form of an “inducement”
factor. For example, under the English law of confidentiality, a
third party will be bound by the same obligation of confidence as
an original confidant if the third party learned of the information
through the confidant and took it with notice of its confidential
nature.157 Under English and American law, in some contexts,
third-party recipients who induce confidants to breach their

155 About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Apr. 11,
2012).
156 About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2012).
157 See Campell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373 (2003) 1 Q.B. 633 at 662 (Eng.)
(describing third party’s duty of confidence when he receives information that he knows was
disclosed in breach); Attorney Gen. v. Observer, Ltd., (1990) 1 A.C. 109 (H.L.) 268 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (“The duty of confidence is . . . imposed on a third party who is in
possession of information which he knows is subject to an obligation of confidence . . . .”);
STANLEY, supra note 67, at 3–6 (explaining the basic principle behind the English law of
confidentiality); Abril, supra note 6, at 716 (noting that English common law requires
privity for contractual agreements to be binding); Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 178
(“[A] third party can freely disclose private facts about a person as long as the third party
did not learn the information from a confidant.”).
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obligation can be liable in tort to the original discloser or subject of
the information.158
In a similar fashion, chain contracts would play a key role in
the chain-link confidentiality approach by transferring a
confidant’s obligations to a third-party recipient. This approach is
useful in contexts where extremely limited disclosure of personal
information is necessary. However, as is discussed below, this
approach must be modified to apply more generally to online
information.
3. Perpetuation of the Contractual Chain. To make the chainlink confidentiality approach scalable to the entire Internet, it
must accommodate the flow of information more than the
traditionally restrictive confidentiality law and yet continue to
protect information. To encourage the flow of information within a
protected system, a chain contract must contain a provision that
ensures the perpetuation of the contractual chain. Without such a
provision, the chain-link confidentiality approach would limit the
disclosure of information to only two parties: the initial recipient
and any third parties to whom the recipient discloses information.
That approach alone could solve a number of problems
regarding online privacy. In and of itself, the first two factors of
chain-link confidentiality, restrictions and continuation of the
restrictions, largely reflect our traditional confidentiality laws.
The second factor, continuation of the initial recipient’s
restrictions, simply protects one additional level of disclosure—to
encompass those in privity with the initial recipient of

158 Winn, supra note 44, at 663–65. Winn analyzed a number of cases to ascertain the
general rule in the health care context:
[A] patient has a cause of action against a third party who induces a
physician to breach his fiduciary relationship if the following elements are
met: (1) the third party knew or reasonably should have known of the
existence of the physician—patient relationship; (2) the third party
intended to induce the physician to wrongfully disclose information about
the patient, or the third party should have reasonably anticipated that his
actions would induce the physician to wrongfully disclose such information;
(3) the third party did not reasonably believe that the physician could
disclose that information to the third party without violating the duty of
confidentiality that the physician owed the patient; and (4) the physician
wrongfully divulges confidential information to the third party.
Id. at 664–65.
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information. This approach has already been effective in certain
contexts, such as the protection of health information and the
HIPAA Privacy Rules. Because the approach allows for a limited
disclosure of the information to trusted third parties with a close
relationship to the initial recipient, it provides the traditional
strong confidentiality protections while accommodating the
realities of electronic storage of health information and modern
technology-based business practices.
On its own, however, the HIPAA approach restricts too much
information to be generally applied across the Internet. The
HIPAA Privacy Rules halt the flow of information and protections
after two disclosures: the first, to the initial recipient, and the
second, from the initial recipient to those working in privity with
her. As a result, such a regime would offer little more than the
“one off” protection provided by traditional confidentiality law.
The HIPAA model may be desirable for sensitive health
information that must be tightly controlled, but it would be unduly
burdensome to recipients of information if applied to all personal
information on the Internet. If personal information safeguards
follow the information, online information should not be
systematically and arbitrarily locked down after two levels of
disclosure. Perpetuating the chain of contracts would facilitate the
flow of data by continually re-creating an environment for sharing
that accommodates the sender, receiver, and the subject of the
personal information.
It is with this factor that the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights
excels as a model of chain-link confidentiality. In the initial draft,
section 302(c)(1) provides that “a third party that receives covered
information from a covered entity shall be subject to the provisions
of this Act as if it were a covered entity.”159 This provision in
essence converts all third-party recipients of covered information
into covered entities.160 Because all covered entities are obligated
159 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 302(c)(1) (2011).
The draft provides for some exceptions to this rule, including if the FTC finds that third
parties cannot reasonably comply with the requirements of the Act or if the protections
offered by the bill would not benefit the subject of the information if applied to the third
party. Id. § 302(c)(2).
160 Robert Gellman proposed a similar approach in a model statute for sharing and
protecting deidentified personal information. See Gellman, supra note 123, at 52 (proposing
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to bind third-party recipients to chain contracts, this provision
effectively perpetuates the chain. If the chain of confidentiality
remains intact, information could still be exchanged, yet the
protections would follow. This could be an excellent compromise
that would accommodate the sharing of information while
protecting the downstream use of some personal data.
B. IMPLEMENTATION

Having developed the theory of chain-link confidentiality, this
Essay now explores the various ways that it could be implemented.
Most of the examples of employing chain contracts cited above
have been created by statutes and international agreements.161
However, a chain-link confidentiality regime could also be
implemented through contract, tort, equity law, administrative
regulation, or some combination of these.
The statutory approach exemplified by the Commercial Privacy
Bill of Rights has numerous advantages. States could clearly
provide the impetus for all three of the essential terms in the chain
contract. Statutes also could create the general framework but
delegate the particulars to administrative agencies that can more
nimbly respond to technological change. As a civil rights issue,
statutes would send a clear message that Congress, responding to
public will, believes that the privacy of Internet users is
indispensable. However, statutes are notoriously difficult to pass
and amend. If the statute were not drafted correctly, it could
a statute allowing for voluntary data protection contracts where “[i]f allowed by the original
data use agreement, the data recipient can become a data discloser with respect to the next
recipient, and the protections continue in force because a new data use agreement is
required” (footnote omitted)).
161 S. 799 § 302(c)(1) (stating that “a third party that receives covered information from a
covered entity shall be subject to the provisions of this Act as if it were a covered entity”);
HIPAA Privacy Rules, 45 C.F.R. § 164.504 (2010) (requiring that those to whom various
types of organizations transfer protected health information agree to the “same restrictions
and conditions” that the organization agreed to); Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and
Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666, 45,668 (July 24, 2000) (stating
that an organization wishing to transfer protected information to a third party must require
the third party to comply with the Safe Harbor Principles by written agreement); Council
Directive 95/46/EC, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (only allowing processing of personal
data if necessary to perform a contract to which the data subject is a party or “to take steps
at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract”).
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create problems for Internet users, websites, ISPs, countless
businesses, and the courts charged with administering the law.
The impetus for chain-link confidentiality might more
effectively arise from a purely contractual approach. Websites
might feel compelled to compete for a user’s loyalty not only by
promising to protect personal information but also by promising
that protections would follow the website user’s personal
information downstream. A purely contractual approach also
could be more flexible than a statutory one. Websites could craft
protections based on the kinds of information that they collect and
the design of the website or the services offered. A purely
contractual approach could, in theory, better accommodate a
website’s business model as well as the users’ expectations.
A purely contractual approach to chain-link confidentiality
could also provide a benefit often absent from statutory schemes,
including the proposed Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights: a
private cause of action for the subjects of the information.162 Such
a right would have to be stipulated, however. By default, only the
parties to a contract have a right to enforce their agreement.163 In
an online chain-link system, after the initial contract between an
individual and a website, the parties to a contract would all be
current and future recipients of information, leaving the individual
powerless to enforce the chain contracts. The websites and
recipients of information have little incentive to enforce these
chain contracts if they are breached. After all, the confidentiality
protections are for the benefit of the user, not the other contract
adherents.
To make these contracts meaningful, the Internet user (and the
subject of the information if they are not the same person) must be
able to enforce the obligation of confidentiality anywhere along the
chain. This can be done by requiring each chain contract to
designate the Internet user as a third-party beneficiary to the

162 See Wolf, supra note 150 (“No private rights of action are allowed [in the Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights] and state laws, except those dealing with health or financial
information, data breach notification or fraud are preempted.”).
163 See 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 610 (1999) (“Generally, however, one who is not a party or in
privity, and from whom no consideration moves, cannot sue for, or complain of, a breach of
the contract, even though injured by such breach.” (footnotes omitted)).
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contract.164 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares that
“[a] promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any
intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended
beneficiary may enforce the duty.”165 So long as the chain contract
makes it clear that the parties intend for the Internet user to have
the right to enforce the contract, the law will honor that intent.166
Once the Internet user has been established as a third-party
beneficiary, the user could bring an action based on two kinds of
breach: (1) breach of a restriction on the information itself, such as
a failure to anonymize information, or (2) failure to impose
confidence upon another recipient of the information or failure to
continue the contractual chain when transferring personal
information.
A purely contractual approach would also have drawbacks. The
initial contract between the website and the user would likely be
standard form, which is a highly problematic area with respect to
online privacy.167 Users rarely read or understand the complex
164 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 123, at 51 (stating that under current law, data subjects
are unable to sue on a contract between a data discloser and a data recipient because of lack
of privity).
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
166 See id. § 302(1) (noting that circumstances can indicate when the benefit of the promise
is intended).
167 See Barnes, supra note 96, at 1547–48 (highlighting the privacy problems spyware
poses even though consumers often assent to spyware license agreements when they
download other programs); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away
Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007) (stating that
websites increasingly use privacy policies to limit their liability in how they share or sell
individuals’ information); Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 800
(2007) (observing that courts often find that consumers have assented to nonnegotiated
software licenses even if they have not actually read the terms); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of
Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 463 (2006) (noting that simply by using the Internet, employees
of large corporations bind their companies to hundreds of different contracts with possibly
inconsistent obligations); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
529, 549–50 (2007) (discussing the communication problems associated with technologymediated contracting contrasted with real space contracting, where parties negotiate faceto-face); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1307, 1315 (2005) (noting that courts apply the objective theory of contracts even with
electronically-delivered terms despite the differences between paper and electronic
communications); Nancy S. Kim, ‘Wrap Contracts and Privacy 1 (Ass’n for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence Press Technical Report SS-10-05, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1580111 (observing that websites may take advantage of their customers’ lack
of knowledge of clickwrap and browsewrap agreements by inserting more aggressive and
intrusive terms).
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terms in these contracts.168 Additionally, users are typically
unable to negotiate terms with websites if they find the current
terms unacceptable. Their only recourse is simply to walk away.
Professor Paul Schwartz noted that “the phenomenon of ‘bounded
rationality’ means that many consumers will accept whatever
terms that data processors offer for their personal information.
Behavioral economics scholarship has demonstrated that
consumers’ general inertia toward default terms is a strong and
pervasive limitation on free choice.”169 Yet, given some novel
approaches and a robust marketplace for privacy, a purely
contractual approach to chain-link confidentiality is possible.170
Alternatively, the breach of confidence tort could be expanded
to accommodate the chain-link system. Numerous scholars have
called for greater recognition of this tort by courts.171 The tort of
breach of confidence has similar requirements to contracts of
confidentiality, yet allows for a broader recovery of damages and is
not so bound by the technical requirements of contract
formation.172 According to Richards and Solove:
A plaintiff can establish a breach of confidence action
by proving the existence and breach of a duty of
confidentiality. Courts have found the existence of
such a duty by looking to the nature of the relationship
between the parties, by reference to the law of
168 Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the
Coming Decade, 3 ISJLP 723, 740 (2007) (reporting that only 1.4% of study participants
reported reading the terms of standard-form electronic agreements often and thoroughly,
66.2% rarely read or browse these agreements, and 7.7% indicated that they have not noticed
the agreements in the past or have never read them); Andy Greenberg, Who Reads the Fine
Print Online? Less than One Person in 1000, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2010, 3:15 PM), http://www.forb
es.com/sites/firewall/2010/04/08/who-reads-the-fine-print-online-less-than-one-person-in-1000/
(reporting that “just [0].11% of users click on a link to a site’s terms of service”).
169 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 2081 (footnote omitted); see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia
and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587–92 (1998) (noting bias in favor of default terms).
170 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1639
(2011) (arguing that website features and design, such as privacy settings, should be
considered enforceable promises in some contexts).
171 See supra notes 5, 44.
172 See Gilles, supra note 40, at 54–60 (noting that the tort of breach of confidentiality
does not require a contract and allows recovery for mental suffering, injury to reputation,
and punitive damages).
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fiduciaries, or by finding an implied contract of
confidentiality.173
Like the purely contractual approach, a purely tort-based
approach to chain-link confidentiality would require novel
approaches and a robust privacy market. However, according to
some, the tort of confidentiality could be used to supplement a
statutory confidentiality scheme by providing a private cause of
action absent from the statute. Winn concluded that this was the
case for the HIPAA Privacy Rules because they “are likely to be
adopted in private state actions for breach of confidentiality as
establishing the duty whose breach is the predicate for the
underlying tort claim.”174 Under this logic, depending on the
wording, a statutory chain-link confidentiality scheme that does
not provide for a private right of action could still form the
confidential duty that serves as the basis for the breach of
confidence tort. Given the flexibility of the common law, courts
could expand the tort to apply to third-party recipients.
In addition to the “inducement” cause of action previously
discussed,175 courts could adopt the English law approach to
confidentiality, which binds third-party recipients to an obligation
of confidence if they knew or should have known the information
they received was confidential.176 The extension of confidentiality
obligations to third parties could be recognized in equity as well.177
Richards & Solove, supra note 5, at 157 (footnote omitted).
Winn, supra note 44, at 619–20 (emphasis omitted).
175 See supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
176 See STANLEY, supra note 67, at 25. Stanley summarized the relevant English law as
follows:
A defendant who has not agreed to keep information confidential will have
notice of its confidentiality sufficient to impose an obligation of confidence
if, at the time of publication or use,
(a) the defendant actually knows that the information is confidential,
(b) it is obvious that the information is confidential, but the defendant
willfully shuts his eye to that fact, or
(c) on the facts as they are known to the defendant, a reasonable person
would know that the information is confidential.
Id.
177 See id. at 3 (finding that, historically, if a third party knew that disclosed information
was something a discloser had agreed to keep confidential, then equity would impose a
similar obligation on that third party); Abril, supra note 6, at 716 (“Under English law . . . a
third party will owe an equitable obligation of confidence to the information’s originator if
173
174
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a flexible concept that
enforces promises one detrimentally relied upon.178
Regardless of how chain-link confidentiality is implemented,
such a system would not be a cure-all. Online privacy problems
encompass more than the collection, use, and dissemination of
personal information. Solove’s taxonomy of privacy harms also
includes what he calls “invasions” into people’s private affairs,
which need not involve personal information.179 Depending on how
a chain-link regime is crafted, it might only cover self-disclosed
personal information, not information about individuals disclosed
by third parties. For example, employers, directory services,
media outlets, and a host of other websites post information about
other people that they collect offline.
Not all information collected by websites is voluntarily disclosed
to third parties.
The practice of “scraping” websites using
automated software to harvest data, while often a violation of a
website’s terms of service,180 ostensibly would be difficult to police
in a chain-link regime.181 Moreover, not all self-disclosed personal
information is disclosed online. Thus, a policy decision would need
to be made as to whether a chain-link confidentiality regime would
include all personal information or only information disclosed and
collected online.
Additionally, this approach would cease to be effective once the
chain is broken. Professor Patricia Sánchez Abril recognized this
problem, stating: “When a contract governs the disclosure of
information, the individual seeking protection is charged with
obtaining the consent of everyone to whom the information is
the third party receives it with notice of its confidentiality.” (footnote omitted)).
178 See Hartzog, supra note 61, at 911–13 (discussing the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
179 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 105; see also Calo, supra note 19,
at 1133 (describing one kind of privacy harm as subjective, that is, “the perception of
unwanted observation,” which “describes unwelcome mental states—anxiety, for instance,
or embarrassment—that accompany the belief that one is or will be watched or monitored”).
180 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that
Verio’s solicitation of Register’s registrants violated its terms of agreement); Pollstar v.
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (“Pollstar further alleges
that . . . [Gigmania] has downloaded concert information from [Pollstar’s] web site [sic] and
used the information for commercial purposes in breach of the [license agreement].”).
181 See Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 107, at A1 (“The emerging business of web
scraping provides some of the raw material for a rapidly expanding data economy.”).
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disseminated. One break in the chain of trust is all it takes for the
subject information to become freely distributable and viral.”182
While a cause of action could still lie with the party in breach,
other remedies like the privacy torts, electronic surveillance
statutes, and administrative regulations would be required to
police those not in the chain of privity.
Even in light of these weaknesses, however, chain-link
confidentiality could protect a lion’s share of personal information
on the Internet due to the concentration of our initial disclosures:
ISPs and a handful of websites each day. Laws need not be perfect
or perfectly enforced to be effective.183 Indeed, as many have
noted, the law, by itself, is not adequate to protect the privacy of
Internet users. As noted by Professor Larry Lessig, social norms,
systems design, and a robust marketplace must all be utilized for
this goal as well.184
IV. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas wrote in a 1967
dissenting opinion that the authors of the Bill of Rights believed
that “every individual needs both to communicate with others and
to keep his affairs to himself.”185 He interpreted this to mean that
“the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the
time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others
and decide the extent of that sharing.”186 The need articulated by
Justice Douglas is at the very heart of what is at stake regarding
our privacy on the Internet.
Individuals voluntarily and
involuntarily disclose far too much personal information online to
be subjected to complete transparency. While Internet use is a
near necessity in modern society, its use leaves individuals
Abril, supra note 6, at 715 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 102, at 67 (“The law need not be completely
effective to be adequately effective. All the law aims to do is to raise the costs of the activity
in order to limit that activity to acceptable levels.” (footnote omitted)).
184 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85, 142–63 (1999)
(arguing that the infrastructure of Internet “code” can help achieve a healthy balance
between privacy and liberty online).
185 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
186 Id.
182
183
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vulnerable to privacy harms with little opportunity and few tools
to protect themselves. Thus, it is critical to protect users’ privacy
online.
One of the most challenging aspects of this task is the
protection of information once it is exposed to other people. This
Essay has offered a theory of chain-link confidentiality as an
approach to protecting online privacy. This approach could
empower users to enforce their privacy rights as well as create an
architecture for systemic privacy protection.
A chain-link confidentiality approach would use contracts to
link disclosers and recipients of personal information. These
contracts would contain at least three kinds of terms: (1)
obligations and restrictions on the use of the disclosed information;
(2) requirements to bind future recipients to the same obligations
and restrictions; and (3) requirements to perpetuate the
contractual chain. This theory is envisioned as a compromise
allowing for greater dissemination of information than a strict
confidentiality regime, while also providing more significant
protection for users than the currently limited and often
ineffective privacy laws.
Internet users might suspect their private information is
broadcast to a nameless, faceless mass of strangers from the
moment they log on. It is not, at least not at first. Users have
relationships with ISPs and websites, with whom they disclose
personal, often sensitive information. Users must trust websites
with this personal information. Websites have relationships with
third parties to whom they disclose that personal information or
provide access to the user through the use of cookies and other
data collection tools. These relationships also should be ones of
trust.
The confidence that users place in ISPs and websites should not
be destroyed by fear and suspicion brought by disclosure to third
parties.
Protections for personal information are largely
ineffective if they are stripped the moment the recipient shares the
information. Yet the collection and use of personal information is
rapidly becoming the backbone of many extremely valuable
Internet services. This is where chain-link confidentiality can
alleviate the tension between confidentiality and the free flow of
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information. The chain-link approach is one of protection and
perpetuation within the context of relationships. By constructing
a chain of protections that follow an Internet user’s disclosure of
information, courts and lawmakers could create a system that
would provide meaningful privacy protection in an environment
built for sharing.

